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This article reviews critically the recent EU legislation and proposals for the regulation of finan-
cial technology (‘fintech”) and makes recommendations for legal improvements in the pro-
posed frameworks, which will help to accelerate fintech growth, a declared EU goal, in the 
years to come. The rise of fintech driven by non-bank entities (technology startups, finance, big 
tech and big retail companies) helps to transform financial services industry, but also threatens 
the market positions of traditional banks and through them potentially the stability of the finan-
cial system. The current EU proposals, as presented in the Commission’s Fintech Action Plan 
published in 2018 and follow-up measures, outlined a number of steps to support fintech, 
while ensuring the protection of market stability and consumers and the maintenance of level 
playing field in the financial services markets. The article argues that, while the Commission’s 
proposed policy mix contains certain positive measures for fintech, it remains, overall, con-
servative and favours the incumbents. It also argues that unless the Commission becomes 
bolder and adopts a more flexible legal framework for fintech (for which the article makes spe-
cific recommendations), the latter will not grow at the pace needed to help build a competitive 
advantage for the EU financial sector. The Commission’s continuing support of the established 
market landscape dominated by financial conglomerates employing traditional business models 
risks undermining the ability of the European financial system to adapt to the changing compe-
tition landscape created by advancing financial technologies and to fully address stability con-
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Financial technology (“fintech”) is a term encompassing a  wide range of technological in-
novations which are used by financial services. Using technology to generate efficiencies and 
improve service to consumer is not a new phenomenon in the sector. The use of telecommuni-
cations and computers, the deployment of ATMs and e-banking are technological innovations 
which had been used in the past to transform financial services
2
. However, the latest wave, 
which emerged after the last financial crisis, is more radical and is expected to have far-reaching 
effects in the industry, primarily because in addition to generating efficiencies and other im-
provements το the business models of established (‘incumbent’) banks, it has also created new 
competitors by bringing to financial markets companies from the technology or finance sector. 
which deliver technology-enabled, data-driven innovative products and services at low cost for 
consumers. Fintech startups, finance companies, established big tech and big retail companies 
deploying artificial intelligence, cloud computing, big data analytics, decentralised digital net-
works and the internet of things
3
 belong to this group. The new entrants can offer a wide range 
of products and services covering the entire financial sector but have particularly strong market 
presence in consumer credit, personal finance and fund transfer markets
4
. Other, more radical 
innovations, such as a new generation of privately issued digital currencies (bitcoin, ether), 
blockchain (or DLT) technology and a financial ecosystem linked to them, create alternative 
financial and currency markets challenging not only established market structures in financial 
services, but also central-bank-issued currencies
5
. Finally, companies have discovered new ways 
to access low-cost finance by selling privately-issued tokens through initial coin offerings (ICOs) 
to investors in exchange for funds
6
. 
Currently, market evidence indicates that the standalone fintech solutions, with a few ex-
ceptions, have not captured a systemically important part of the financial markets, but their 
share and market influence increase rapidly. National regulators participating in the 2019 Fi-
 
2 Dougas W. Arner,  Janos Barberis and Ross P. Buckley, 150 years of Fintech: An evolutionary analy-
sis, 3 The Finsia Journal of Applied Finance, 22 (2016). 
3 Stijn Claessens, Jon Frost, Grant Turner and Feng Zhu, Fintech Credit Markets Around the World: 
Size, Drivers and Policy Issues, BIS Quarterly Review, 29 (2018). 
4 Ibid. 
5 For a discussion of the legal implications from the appearance of crypto-assets see Phoebus Athanassiou, Impact 
of digital innovation on the processing of electronic payments and contracting: an overview of legal risks, Euro-
pean Central Bank, Legal Working Paper Series, No 16, October (2017). 
6 For more details about the situation with the regulation of ICOs see Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group, 
Own Initiative Report on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets, Advice to ESMA, ESMA22-106-1338, 19 Oc-
tober (2018). 
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nancial Stability Board (FSB) Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermedia-
tion
7
, reported that the fast growing fintech credit was one of the key developments in the non-
bank financial space since 2017. The fintech influence in the broader financial industry extends 
well beyond the non-bank, fintech, sector to traditional banks. Most incumbent banks now seek 
to follow their competitors by developing their own technology-driven solutions in partnership 
with fintech companies willing to help them. 
A 2017 PWC Global Fintech Survey
8
, found that 80 percent of incumbents participating 
in its survey believed that their businesses were at risk to standalone fintech competitors. In a 
2018 EY industry survey
9
, disruption from technology was on the top of the emerging risks list 
with 79 percent (same as data integrity and destruction). The PWC Survey found that 82 per-
cent of incumbents would seek to increase their fintech partnerships in the coming years. 
In addition to the competition in the financial markets, there is a parallel race between 
states for market leadership on fintech, as governments see broader benefits for their national 
economies from its use.  
A 2018 EU study
10
 found that US is the market leader with 1500 companies followed by 
EU with 1020. Other market studies
11
 placed EU behind China and US in the global competi-
tion for fintech. Around 45 percent of the EU companies are based in UK, which currently is 
in the process of exiting the EU
12
. EU ranks fifth in the world in fintech investments behind US, 
China, the UK and India
13
. EU fintech companies have smaller size and receive lower average 
 
7 Financial Stability Board, Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation 2018, 
February 4, (2019)  available at http://www.fsb.org/2019/02/global-monitoring-report-on-non-bank-finan-
cial-intermediation-2018/ [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
8 PwC, Global Fintech Report, (2017) and, Stacey English and Susannah Hammond, Cost of Compli-
ance 2018, Report, Thomson Reuters. 
9 EY and Institute of International Finance, Global bank risk management survey, Accelerating digital 
transformation, Ninth Annual EY/IIF Survey, available at  
https://www.ey.com/en_gl/banking-capital-markets/should-risk-management-rein-in-digital-or-help-accel-
erate-it [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
10 A. Fraile Carmona, A. Gonzalez-Quel Lombardo, R. Rivera Pastor, C. Tarin Quiros, J. P. Villar Gar-
cia, D. Ramos Munoz, L. Castejon Martin, Competition issues in the Area of Financial Technology 
(Fintech), Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, Directorate-General 
for Internal Policies, PE 619.027, July, (2018), 
available at https://www.finextra.com/finextra-downloads/newsdocs/ipol_stu.pdf [Accessed 28 Novem-
ber 2019]. 
11 E.g. Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (CCAF) Academy of Internet Finance (AIF) of 
Zhejiang University, The Future of Finance is Emerging: New Hubs, New Landscapes, 14 November 
(2018) 
available at https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/centres/alternative-finance/down-
loads/2018-ccaf-global-fintech-hub-report-eng.pdf [Accessed 28 November 2019] 
12 Carmona et al. supra n.10. 
13 Ibid. 
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funding compared to EU competitors
14
. In addition to the above countries, EU faces competi-




The current position of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and other international regu-
lators
16
 is that the rapid growth of fintech poses a number of potential risks for consumers and 
the stability of the financial system, which need to be monitored closely, but that the market 
size of fintech remains small and therefore there are no immediate systemic risks for the finan-
cial system. Regulators also acknowledge their limited knowledge about certain aspects of the 
new technologies, the inadequacy of existing legal frameworks and the need to use innovative 
regulatory solutions in these technologies (e.g crypto-assets, DLT and ICOs)
17
. For the time be-
ing, existing legal frameworks created for traditional finance (for payments, financial instru-
ments, money laundering etc) are being amended or interpreted flexibly to incorporate aspects 
of fintech
18
 and new frameworks tailored to fintech are being considered
19
. In addition, regula-
tors and financial institutions experiment with tech-based regulatory solutions (the so-called 
‘regtech’
20
), which could allow regulators to monitor in real time the market developments and 
institutions to more effectively comply with regulatory requirements. These technologies are 
still under development. 
While working out a longer term regulatory responses, public authorities have issued a 
number of warnings to the public about potential risks from the use of more radical fintech ap-
plications (e.g crypto-assets) 
21




16 See e.g. Financial Stability Board, Financial Stability Implications from Fintech, Supervisory and Regu-
latory Issues that Merit Authorities’ Attention, (27 June 2017); also the EBA and ESMA findings dis-
cussed below. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See for example the new Payment Services Directive (PSD2), which came into effect in January 2018, 
containing amended provisions incorporating fintech-based payment solutions or the 5th Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive to be enacted in 2020, which aims to include in its scope risks associated with vir-
tual currencies. See also the discussion below about the flexible application of existing rules employed 
by the Commission and the European supervisory authorities (ESAs). 
19 See e.g. the Commission’s proposed regulation on crowdfunding, which is linked to fintech discussed 
later. 
20 For the use for RegTech see European Securities and Markets Authority Regtech and Suptech-
Change for Markets and Regulators,14 March, (2019) available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-
news/esma-news/regtech-and-suptech-–-change-markets-and-regulators [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
21 See e.g. the joint ESAs’ warning to EU consumers: ESMA, EBA and EIOPA warn consumers on the 
risks of Virtual Currencies, 12 February (2018), available at 
https://eba.europa.eu/-/esas-warn-consumers-of-risks-in-buying-virtual-currencies [Accessed 28 
November 2018]. 
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(e.g. innovative payments methods) regulators seem more keen to embrace change and market 
opening and take steps in this direction. 
In EU, the Commission proceeded in March 2018 to the publication of its Fintech Ac-
tion Plan (Fintech AP)
22
 with the purpose of building a “more competitive and innovative Euro-
pean financial sector”. The Plan along with other significant EU flagship initiatives, such as the 
Single Digital Market and the Capital Markets Union, are aimed at taking EU to the new digital 
era. In addition, the European Banking Authority (EBA), published on March 2018 a 
Roadmap for the regulation of fintech
23
, which sets out EBA’s priorities for the period 2018/19. 
The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate the EU Fintech AP and other related 
EU initiatives with the aim of establishing their suitability for achieving the EU fintech objective 
of building a competitive industry which can support the economy without hurting market sta-
bility and consumers. Following the evaluation of EU initiatives, the article will recommend cer-
tain principles and elements which could be incorporated in any future-oriented EU fintech 
framework to make it more effective. The Commission’s AP and other EU policy documents 
have set as a future goal the creation of such a framework as an essential step for the growth of 
the industry. 
The article is structured as follows: section 2 discusses definitional issues and the fintech 
market characteristics in EU; section 3 reviews the current legal situation in EU in regards to 
fintech and focuses particularly on the Fintech AP published in March 2018; section 4 dis-
cusses the follow up measures adopted by EU following the publication of the Action Plan; sec-
tion 5 evaluates the current fintech position of the EU; section 6 presents and discusses the au-
thor’s proposals for essential elements of any effective future oriented framework for fintech; 
section 7 concludes the article.  
 
2. Definitional issues and fintech market characteristics in EU 
 
FSB has defined fintech as ‘technologically enabled financial innovation that could result 
in new business models, applications, processes or products with an associated material effect 
 
22 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Cen-
tral Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Fintech 
Action plan: For a more competitive and innovative European financial sector’, COM/2018/0109 final, 
(8 March 2018). 
23 European Banking Authority, The EBA’s Fintech Roadmap”, Conclusions from the consultation off 
the EBA’s Approach to Financial Technology (Fintech), (15 March 2018), available at https://eba.eu-
ropa.eu/-/eba-publishes-its-roadmap-on-fintech [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
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on financial markets and institutions and the provision of financial services’
24
.The European 
Commission has defined fintech as ‘technology-enabled and technology-supported financial 




A McKinsey Fintech Report
26
 identified four broad fintech variants each operating in dif-
ferent markets using a variety of business models: a. fintechs as “new entrants, startups, and at-
tackers” who seek to establish market positions in financial products and services; b. fintechs as 
incumbents who seek to improve their market performance; c. fintechs as ecosystems orches-
trated by large technology companies (e.g. Alibaba), which have already strong customer base 
and seek to enhance through fintech their existing platforms; d. fintechs as infrastructure pro-
viders, which seek to sell services to financial institutions.    
EBA published in 2018 a report
27
 where it identified a number of key fintech uses for the 
financial industry and carried out an evaluation of the opportunities and risks. The report high-
lighted the following fintech uses:  
a. biometrics (e.g. fingerprint recognition in mobile banking applications) for customer 
authentication. They can be used in addition to existing methods such as passwords, secu-
rity questions etc. to improve consumer experience and security. 
b. Machine-learning and big data techniques to improve the financial institution’s risk 
management and better understand their customers. Credit scoring is one of the prominent 
areas where the new techniques are used. 
c. Automated investment advice through online advice websites and robo-advisors offer-
ing mass-scale investment advice. 
d. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) and smart contracts in the area of trade finance 
to simplify processes and reduce paperworks. DLT can also be used to improve the cus-
tomer identification and verification processes in the context of anti-money laundering 
compliance. 
 
24 Supra n.13. 
25 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council  on the assessment of the 
risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-bor-
der activities,  Brussels, 26.6.2017 COM(2017) 340 final. 
26 McKinsey&Company, Synergy and disruption: Ten trends shaping Fintech, Global Banking, Decem-
ber, (2018) available at https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/synergy-and-
disruption-ten-trends-shaping-fintech 
27 European Banking Authority, Report on the prudential risks and opportunities arising for institutions 
from Fintech, 3 July (2018), available at https://eba.europa.eu/-/eba-assesses-risks-and-opportunities-
from-fintech-and-its-impact-on-incumbents-business-models [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
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e. Mobile wallets such as Apple Pay with the use of Near Field Communication (NFC). 
This method allows linking credit/debit cards to mobile devices, which can be used for e-
commerce and point-of-sale (POS) payments. 
f. Cloud services which allow financial institutions to migrate core systems to public 
clouds, which offer flexibility lower-costs, scalability and agility. 
In the above areas fintech contributes to improved customer experience while assisting 
banks to lower their costs and improve their services. Financial inclusion may also improve due 
to the ability of fintech to reach underserved or excluded by incumbents customers. On the 
negative side, the EBA analysis found a number of risks
28
 associated with bank dependence on 
IT companies for running the fintech applications, the risks inherent to IT (e.g. cyber-security 
problems), the currently untested status of many of the new technologies, concerns about the 
management, analysis and exchange/transfer of customer data and jurisdictional issues associ-
ated with the decentralised nature of many new technologies which have spread through the in-
ternet across different countries and regions. 
EBA has also paid particular attention to the impact of fintech on incumbent credit insti-
tutions. Its analysis
29
, identified the transformative and disruptive effects of fintech in the tradi-
tional financial sector, as it helps banks to improve their internal processes, but also disrupts 
the function of traditional markets creating new financial markets where independent fintech 
companies can have significant and sometimes dominant presence. EBA’s analysis noted that 
although fintech threatens through increased competition the revenues of incumbent banks, it 
can also help the latter to become more stable and integrated. Currently, many incumbent 
banks seek to address the challenge by developing partnerships with fintech companies
30
. Oth-
ers have accelerated the adoption of fintech-inspired innovations although larger financial insti-
tutions with complex structures face significant challenges
31
. The involvement from fintech-side 
of many big tech companies creates the conditions for increased competition in the financial 
markets, which could create a new more diverse financial ecosystem in the future.  
In terms of the types and features of fintech companies active in EU a market survey  by 
EBA
32




30 European Banking Authority, Risk Assessment of the European Banking System, December  (2018), 
available at https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-assessment-reports [Accessed 28 November 
2019]; also ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 European Banking Authority, Discussion Paper on the EBA’s approach to financial technology 
(Fintech), EBA/DP/2017/02, (4 August 2017). 
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with dominant or strong presence in the markets for payments, clearing, compliance and lend-
ing; they apply a wide range of financial innovations such as online distribution channels, online 
platforms (eg. crowdfunding, peer-to-peer transfers); they target a range of end-users primarily 
consumers and regulated financial institutions; a significant proportion of them is in control of 
customer funds; they are subject to highly varied regulatory regimes with some of them being 
subject to EU law, some to national laws
33
, while others are not regulated; national authorisation 
regimes cover various types of fintech companies and vary in their characteristics. 
The EBA’s mapping exercise also highlighted the existence in half of EU jurisdictions of 





3. The current legal situation in EU and the Fintech Action Plan 
 
A 2017 report of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Af-
fairs, called on the Commission
35
  ‘…to draw up a comprehensive Fintech Action Plan…. which 
can contribute overall to achieving an efficient and competitive, deeper and more integrated 
and stable and sustainable European financial system, provide long-term benefits to the real 
economy and address the needs of consumer and investor protection and of regulatory 
certainty’. The Commission should adopt
36
 a ‘proportionate, cross-sectorial and holistic ap-
proach’ to fintech, using lessons learned from other jurisdictions and adapting to the diverse 
environment of fintech. The European Parliament has also called the Commission to act, 
where possible, as a first mover in the international competition for fintech
37
. 
In 2017 the European Council called
38
 the Commission to urgently address emerging 
trends in areas such as artificial intelligence and blockchain, while ensuring “a high level of data 
protection, digital rights and ethical standards”. The European Council also called the Com-





35 European Parliament, Fintech: the influence of Technology on the Future of the Financial Sector, 
(2016/2243(INI))”, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, A8-0176/2017, (28 April 2017).  
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. para. 4. 
38European Council meeting (19 October 2017) – Conclusions, EUCO 14/17, CO EUR 17, CONCL 5, 
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21620/19-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf [Accessed 
28 November 2019]. 
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with a view to enable the EU to explore new markets through risk-based radical innovations 
and to reaffirm the leading role of its industry”
39
. 
The Commission’s Action Plan (AP), which was published on 8 March, 2018, highlights 
the EU decision to create a more “future-oriented regulatory framework” which embraces digit-
isation and creates an environment where “… innovative fintech products and solutions can be 
rapidly rolled out across the EU to benefit from the economies of scale of the single market 
without compromising financial stability or consumer and investor protection”
40
.  
The AP stresses the significant market benefits from the use of fintech and its significance 
for the Capital Markets Union (CMU), another big EU project for which the Commission pub-
lished an Action plan in 2015
41
.  CMU is aimed at unlocking more investments from EU and 
internationally, connect finance to investments, make the financial system more stable and 
deepen financial integration and competition
42
. Fintech will help to deepen and broaden CMU, 
“by integrating the potential of digitisation to change business models through data-driven solu-
tions in asset management, investment intermediation and product distribution”
43
. 
The AP emphasises that EU regulation and supervision should allow firms to benefit 
from financial innovation, but they should also ensure the protection of consumers and inves-
tors  and the resilience and integrity of the financial system. Earlier, in the Fintech Consultation 
document
44
,  the Commission identified three core principles on which its fintech approach will 
be based: technological neutrality, proportionality, and market integrity. Between proportional-
ity and market integrity the Commission’s choice is the latter and should be secured through 
appropriate regulation
45
. Emphasis is given on measures dealing with cybersecurity, anti-money 
laundering/terrorism financing, data and consumer protection. Clarifying the EU approach, 
EBA argued
46
 that any inconsistencies in regulation or any regulatory gaps could lose the trust 
of consumers. Regulatory consistency is to be achieved through the “same service, same rules” 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Preamble of the Plan. 
41 Communication ‘Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union’, COM(2015) 468, 30 September 
(2015); Communication ‘On the Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan’, 
COM(2017) 292, (8 June 2017). 
42 2015 Communication ibid.  
43 Mid-term Review of CMU Action Plan supra n. 41, para. 4.3. 
44 European Commission Fintech: A more competitive and innovative European financial sector, (16 
March 2017), available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/finance-2017-fintech_en [Accessed 28 
November 2019]. 
45 See European Banking Authority’s response to Deutsche Bank in the context of its 2017 Discussion 
paper on Fintech (the Document and other responses are available at https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-
and-policy/other-topics/approach-to-financial-technology-fintech-/-/regulatory-activity/discussion-paper ) 
[Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
46 Ibid. 
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approach. This approach also supports the achievement of other policy goals, such as that of 
regulatory arbitrage avoidance and of the establishment of level playing field between fintech 
and incumbent banks. 
Other EU legal instruments such as the Payment Services Directive
47
 and the Directive 
and Regulation on Markets in Financial Instruments
48
 have also been dealing with similar objec-
tives. The AP emphasises the Commission’s earlier proposal, as part of the review of the Euro-
pean supervisory framework
49
 that the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) should sys-
tematically consider fintech in all their activities. The General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)
50
, which came into force in 2018 and eIDAs Regulation
51
 are both aimed at regulating 
the use, management and flow of data, which are essential elements of fintech innovations. 
The AP identifies three broad areas of activity for promoting the above-mentioned policy 
objectives: a. enable innovative business models to reach EU scale; b. support the uptake of fi-
nancial innovation in the financial sector; c. enhance security and integrity of the financial sec-
tor. 
 




The AP highlights the need for an EU-wide “comprehensive European passporting re-
gime” for crowdfunding providers, which will address inconsistencies and ineffectiveness in the 
current mix of EU and national applicable laws and enable innovative businesses to scale-up 
across EU, while ensuring sufficient protection for investors and project owners. The proposed 
regime will ensure the stability, integrity, and fairness of the relevant markets. The AP high-
lights the need for further efforts to identify diverging licensing requirements that affect fintech 
firms and highlights follow-up actions to clarify the applicable EU legislative frameworks for 
 
47 Directive 2015/2366/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on 
payment services in the internal market. 
48 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments and Regulation EU 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments. 
49 European System of Financial Supervision, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/banking-and-finance/financial-supervision-and-risk-management/european-system-financial-supervi-
sion_en#reviewoftheesfs [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
50 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 
51 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on 
electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repeal-
ing Directive 1999/93/EC. 
52 Section 1 of the Plan. 
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services; assess the need for a new framework for fintech business models; and provide guid-
ance to ensure convergence of national regulations.  
The AP makes significant mention to crypto-assets, a new generation of digital assets 
linked to private issuers (e.g. Libra, bitcoin, ether), and initial coin offerings (ICOs), which is an 
innovative way of raising money using privately issued ‘coins’ or ‘tokens’. These innovations of-
fer significant opportunities and but also risks, which need to be identified and addressed. The 
AP highlights the decision to incorporate crypto-assets into the scope of the 5th Anti-money 
Laundering Directive, which will enter into force in 2020, and aims to address money launder-
ing concerns. The AP also calls for an assessment of the suitability of existing EU regulatory 
frameworks for these assets.  
The AP calls for the development of open standards that increase competition, enhance 
interoperability and simplify the exchange of and access to data between market players, steps 
which the Commission deems essential for the development of the fintech industry in EU. The 
AP proposes that the standard-setting processes should be based on the principles of openness, 
transparency and consensus, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 on European 
standardisation. The Commission would prefer the standards to be developed by the industry 
and market participants and be global rather than local or regional. 
The AP calls for the expansion of “fintech facilitators” and development of best practices, 
which will allow innovative businesses to test their innovations for compliance with regulation in 
innovation hubs and regulatory sandboxes where regulators can provide them with guidance. 
The facilitators can also help regulators better understand the potential market implications 
from the use of proposed innovations. 
 
b. Measures to support the uptake of technological innovation in the financial sector
53
   
 
Earlier EU legislation did not always support the technology neutrality principle currently 
adopted by the EU.  Paper disclosures and physical presence have been cited as examples of 
out-of-date legislation together with absence of clear and harmonised processes to identify con-
sumers and businesses online
54
. 
The AP refers to Commission’s initiatives to facilitate cross-border e-identification and 
remote know-your-customer processes in particular eIDAS, which is used as a key legal instru-
ment, whereas the Commission has set up a dedicated expert group to deal with the issue. 
 
53 Section 2 of the Plan. 
54 Para. 2.1 
 
ILIAS KAPSIS  12 
The AP also identifies  the need for further research in areas with limited EU knowledge, 
such as the jurisdictional issues around the decentralised blockchain-based applications;  issues 
of validity and enforceability of smart contracts, a type of electronic contracts which are used in 
some fintech transactions, and uncertainties about the legal status of ICOs and the regulatory 
rules applicable to them. 
The AP identifies deficiencies in the current legal framework for cloud services which are 
being increasingly used by fintech companies. Cloud services make extensive use of cross-bor-
der data flows, which are currently regulated by a nexus of national and EU rules, but the level 
of harmonisation is not high. The AP calls cloud stakeholders to develop cross-sectoral self-reg-
ulatory codes of conduct which will facilitate switching between cloud service providers.  The 
AP calls the financial sector to enable easier data porting for financial institutions. The AP also 
calls cloud providers and financial institutions to develop standard contractual clauses for cloud 
outsourcing by financial institutions. 
The Commission also proposes a new regulation, which will establish a framework for 
the free flow of non-personal data in the EU, which will remove unnecessary local barriers to 
such flows. 
The AP identifies the great significance of blockchain and distributed ledger technologies, 
which could have a transformative effect not only on the financial sector but also on other sec-
tors of the economy and also in society
55
. The AP refers to the need to closely monitor the de-
velopment of these technologies which are still in early stage, and which in addition to benefits 
are also associated with significant risks. The AP refers to the EU Blockchain Observatory and 
Forum, the European Financial Transparency Gateway and other initiatives in the direction of 
both monitoring potential risks and facilitating the further development of beneficial aspects of 
the new technologies. An EU Fintech Club operating in a technology-neutral environment is to 
be established to help increase regulators’ and supervisors’ knowledge and help the to design 
appropriate regulatory responses. 
The AP notes the high complexity, costs and uncertainty about investment products for 
retail investors who are engaging with capital markets
56
. Data-driven solutions based on new 
technologies are currently used to improve access to information, disclosure, transparency and 
comparability about these investments. Fintech using user-friendly interfaces offers online cal-
culation, comparison tools, automated-advisors and fund supermarkets. The Commission pro-
poses action in the direction of studying the market landscape to offer further improvements.   
 
55 Para. 2.3. 
56 Para. 2.5. 
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The AP notes that the increasing dependence of the financial sector on digital technolo-
gies increases the risk of cyberattacks. In order to build a safe and resilient financial sector, the 
AP proposes the adoption of a 'security by design approach' and to that effect the creation of an 
EU certification framework for ICT security products and services. 
The AP identifies improved cyber security as one of the top priorities. Issues of cyber se-
curity are currently covered by the Directive on security of network and information systems
58
, 
but the AP recognises that  gaps in the system may remain. The AP calls for better information 
and intelligence sharing and regular testing. Enhance cooperation and coordination is essential. 
The AP acknowledges that some information sharing may be contrasted by legislation 
such as the General Data Protection Regulation but notes that the Regulation legitimises the 
necessary and proportionate processing of personal data necessary for the purpose of ensuring 
network and information security. The AP also cites the need for more coordination and coop-
eration across EU and identifies actions in the direction. The AP also invites ESAs to carry out 
a cost/benefit analysis for the development of a coherent cyber resilience testing framework for 
the whole EU financial sector. 
 
4. Follow-up measures 
 
The EU efforts to develop the digital economy and enhance the competitiveness of EU 
industry, continued after the publication of the Commission’s Fintech Action Plan.  
In March 2018 EBA published its Fintech Roadmap
59
 which set out the Authority’s next 
steps for the period 2018/19. These include: the market monitoring and assessment of the cur-
rent authorisation and licensing approach to fintech and analysis of regulatory sandboxes and 
innovation hubs; the monitoring of market trends and analysis of fintech impact on incum-
bents; the promotion of best supervisory practices on cybersecurity and promotion of a com-
mon cyber threat testing framework; the addressing of consumer issues arising from fintech; the 
 
57 Section 3 of the Plan. 
58 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning 
measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union. 
59 Supra n. 23. 
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identification and assessment of money laundering/terrorism financing issues. EBA also prom-
ised to work closely with the industry and with other public authorities in pursue of the above 
goals. 
In March 2018 the European Central Bank published the Guide to assessments of 
Fintech credit institution licence applications
60
. The Guide applies to licensing applications 
within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The Guide defines fintech banks as those 
having “a business model in which the production and delivery of banking products and ser-
vices are based on technology-enabled innovation
61
. The definition captures both fintech sub-
sidiaries of existing authorised banks and new market participants. The purpose of the Guide is 
to enhance transparency for fintech applicants and increase their understanding of the proce-
dure and criteria applied by the ECB in its assessment of licence applications.  
The relevant criteria introduced in the Guide are in addition to the licensing criteria 
which apply for traditional banks and aim at covering the special features of fintech. By way of 
example, the guide provides that due to the technology-driven business models of fintech 
banks, the criteria for the suitability of members of management bodies in these banks, should 
include IT competence in addition to the standards banking knowledge
62
. Also, given the con-
stant changes in shareholders occurring in fintech banks and the background of the initial 
shareholders (usually a mix of founders and venture capital providers) the guide provides that 
any shareholder with a qualifying holding should have management and technical competence 
in the area of financial activities, including financial services
63
. Fintech banks tend to outsource 
credit-scoring services or rely on alternative sources of data and alternative credit-scoring meth-
odologies than traditional banks. These banks also tend to have a significant number of cus-
tomers based beyond the licence-covered country. The credit-scoring processes of the fintech 
banks will be assessed by the authorities and country-specific credit-scoring processes may be 
established
64
. There are also provisions for the cloud outsourcing, IT-related risks, data man-
agement, the operational environment of fintech banks, which is more unstable and capital, li-




60 European Central Bank  (2018) “Guide to assessments of Fintech credit institution licence applica-
tions”, March 23, available at https://www.bankingsupervision.eu-
ropa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.201803_guide_assessment_fintech_credit_inst_licens-
ing.en.pdf?1c99fa2126f6ef80eb61a276bab94379  
61 Ibid., para. 1.2. 
62 Section 2. 
63 Section 3. 
64 Section 4.1. 
65 Sections 4-6. 
 
ILIAS KAPSIS  15 
ECB justified
66
 the need for a separate guide for fintech by reference to the steady in-
crease in applications and related questions from fintech banks and on the need to develop a 
common approach with national supervisors on the matter. ECB’s was quick to emphasise that 
the existence of a separate guide will not result in additional barriers to entry
67
 or in treating 
fintech banks differently than any other banks: fintech banks are subject to the same assessment 
criteria as traditional banks. Also, the Guide emphasises the technological neutrality of its pro-
visions a statement which is echoed also in the Fintech Action Plan.  
In September 2018 EU introduced a new regulation (2018/1724) aimed at establishing a 
single digital gateway to provide access to information, to procedures and to assistance and 
problem-solving services
68
. The list of types of information covered includes “…buying goods, 
digital content or services (including financial services) from another Member State, on-line or 
in person”. 
In October 2018 the EU presented a proposal for a Directive on the re-use of public sec-
tor information
69
. The initiative, part of the EU framework for a Single Digital Market, seek 
“…to bring the legislative framework up to date with the advances in digital technologies, such 
as Artificial Intelligence and the Internet of Things”. At the end of 2018 of a new Regulation by 
the European Parliament and the Council, establishes a framework for the free flow of non-
personal data in the EU
70
. The regulation is aimed at banning data localisation restrictions and 
allowing companies to choose the cloud providers that suits them best, a step which the Com-
mission and the Council consider that with help to create jobs and facilitate growth
71
. The regu-
lation came into force in May 2019. 
 
66 European Central Bank, Feedback statement, Response to the public consultation on the Guide to 
assessments of licence applications and the Guide to assessments of fintech credit institution licence ap-
plications, March (2018),  available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/public-
cons/pdf/licensing_and_fintech/ssm.feedbackstatement.en.pdf [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Regulation (EU) 2018/1724…of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... establishing a single 
digital gateway to provide access to information, to procedures and to assistance and problem-solving 
services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012.  
69 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Open Data and the re-use of public sec-
tor information (recast) Brussels, 25 October (2018), 2018/0111 (COD). 
70 Regulation (EU) 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on 
a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union PE/53/2018/REV/1OJ L 
303, 28 November (2018). 
71 See also the relevant statement by Margarete Schramböck, Austrian Federal Minister for Digital and 
Economic Affairs and President of the Council: “Strengthening the data sector will improve Europe's 
competitiveness. The free flow of data is key for growth and creating jobs, and will provide more flexi-
bility for our companies. From now on they will be able to choose the cloud provider that suits them 
best”. Available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/11/09/free-flow-of-
data-eu-adopts-new-rules/ [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
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Also, mention should be made to the revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2)
72
, which 
entered into force in 12 January 2016, with deadline for Member State implementation  13 Jan-
uary 2018. The purpose of PSD2 is to bring into the scope of regulation innovative payment 
products or services offered by fintech companies, many of which previously were unregulated. 
The Directive also contains certain fintech facilitating measures, such as those opening the mar-
ket to payment initiation services providers and account information services providers, who 
provide to consumer easy online payments and purchases, while allowing them to have a global 
view of their financial situation at any given time. Traditional banks are required to provide ac-
cess to customer accounts to the payment initiation services providers in order to allow them to 
prove their services. 
 
5. Evaluation of the EU approach to fintech 
 
The planned initiatives will help to build a more harmonised EU framework for fintech, 
but a critical question, which will have to be answered is if these initiatives go far enough to help 
achieve EU’s ambitious agenda for fintech. Such an evaluation may seem premature at this 
stage as it will take some time until all the necessary measures are fully adopted and their mar-
ket impact is fully understood, but some preliminary evaluative comments can be made:  
 
a. Priority to innovations which improve competitiveness, service to consumers and sup-
port market stability and integrity without compromising on consumer protection. 
 
From the overall AP document, it emerges that the Commission is clearly prepared to 
support the development of financial innovations where the latter would reinforce the stability 
and competitiveness of the financial system, while improving service to consumers without 
compromising on consumer protection. Achieving, though, all these goals at once could be dif-
ficult as the need to maintain market stability and consumer protection would normally have 
competitiveness as a victim due to the intensity of rule-making and extensive interventions of 
regulators in the two other areas. Fintech benefits from the opening of markets and limited reg-
ulation and the existence of strong consumer and stability rules could slow its growth.  
 
72 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on 
payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 
2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC. 
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 The Commission’s Open Banking initiative can be a good example of potential benefits 
and risks for fintech. The aim of the initiative is to improve competition by forcing incumbent 
bank to share their clients’ data with fintech competitors through measures, such as PSD2 dis-
cussed earlier. Significant competitive gains can be expected in certain markets particularly pay-
ments, personal finance and consumer advice
73
.  
It has to be noted though that these competitive improvements do not have the potential 
to upset existing market balances, which in the eyes of the Commission would create threats to 
market stability
74
. Thus, despite the market opening, Open Banking does not actually threaten 
the market dominance of incumbents as the latter remain largely in control of customer data. A 
closer look to the application of the initiative explains why market balance with not be seriously 
affected:  
Incumbents have built large consumer bases and databanks exploiting their long market 
presence and the broad relationship with their customers. Most fintechs, as explained earlier, 
are new with small market size and limited resources, so they lack the ability to offer the same 
range of services or to build vast consumer networks. For this reason they focus on certain spe-
cialist market segments, such as payment and personal finance, where their technology-enabled 
innovations can make a market difference. But even in these market segments fintechs lack ac-
cess to adequate data that would enable them to scale up and create wider consumer solu-
tions
75
. Open Banking aims to help them by giving them access to the broad client bases and 
data controlled by incumbent competitors, but it is clear that incumbents can only share certain 
types of data and for specific purposes. Broader data access is restricted not only because of in-
cumbent resistance
76
 but also by legal barriers, such as those erected by GDPR. GDPR has 
been praised by Fintech AP for enhancing competition in financial markets while ensuring pro-
tection of consumer privacy
77
. Between the competition enhancing provisions of GDPR there is 
 
73
 The Commission’s summary of PSD2 is that ‘it seeks to open up payment markets to new entrants leading to 
more competition, greater choice and better prices for consumers’, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/LSU/?uri=CELEX:32015L2366 [Accessed  28 November 2019]. 
74
 The Commission has already made clear that maintaining market stability is of paramount importance. 
75
 Fintechs need access to big data, which will allow them to understand consumer profiles, preferences and habits. 
Such data are also needed for machine learning on artificial intelligence applications developed by fintechs. For 
more discussion on the competitive significance of big data for fintech see OECD Big Data Bringing Competition 
Policy to the Digital Era, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee, 
DAF/COMP(2016)14, 27 October, (2016).  
76
 For more details on the competitive significant of private data see Inge Graef; Martin Husovec; Nadezhda Pur-
tova, Data Portability and Data Control: Lessons for an Emerging Concept in EU Law, 19 German L.J. 1359 
(2018); Orla Lynskey Aligning Data Protection Rights with Competition Law Remedies? The GDPR right to Data 
Portability” 42(6) E.L. Rev. 793 (2017).   
77
 Fintech AP claims that the GDPR creates ‘…a genuine single market for the free movement of personal data at a 
high level of personal  protection’. 
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Article 20(1)
78
, which establishes for the first time the right of individual to data portability, 
which includes the right to transfer personal data from one online controller to another but this 
provision is balanced by other provisions about  data processing and consumer consent
79
, which 
restrict or prevent data access, processing and sharing thus raising legal barriers for fintech, 
which needs them most. Additional legal barriers have been raised (and more such barriers are 
expected in the future when interpretation of GDPR reaches the Court) by the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice (CJEU), which has on many occasions where it reviewed funda-
mental human rights cases
80
 , made clear that it is willing to restrict not only private company 
activities, but also activities of EU agencies. Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights es-
tablished the personal data as separate right and set conditions for access to the data by third 
parties including the state. 
The overall therefore impact of the EU legislative package about Open Banking and data 
access and sharing, constitutes only a moderate improvement for fintech and, despite the Com-
mission AP declarations, it is certainly not ambitious enough to bring European fintech to a 
global leadership status. In a wider context, the Open Banking case shows the unwillingness of 
the Commission to relax its consumer protection and market stability standards, in  order to 
allow more innovation in financial services. It makes it also difficult to see how fintech growth 
can be accelerated when on balance relaxed restrictions in some areas are offset by raised legal 
barriers elsewhere. 
 
b. The Commission’s hesitation towards more radical innovations. 
 
In regards to more radical fintech solutions, such as crypto-assets, ICOs and DLT, the 
Commission is even more cautious. The latter innovations, although not systemically im-
portant, they have such a potential for the future if they are allowed to grow fast and the Com-
mission clearly does not wish to allow this to happen. For these reasons there are no specific 
legislative initiatives, which will lead towards quick EU-wide access, although the Commission’s 
Fintech AP has requested the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) to assess the suitability 
 
78
 According to article 20: ”The data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning him or her, 
which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and 
have the right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the per-
sonal data have been provided…”  
79
 Asee Articles 5 and 7 of GDPR. 
80
 See e.g Volker und Markus Schecke GbR v Land Hessen (C-92/09 & C-93/09) EU:C:2010:662; Schrems v Data 
Protection Commissioner (C-362/14) EU:C:2015:650.  
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of the EU regulatory framework in regards to these assets, with the potential adoption of legisla-
tion for these innovations been deferred to the future. Instead, by including these innovations 
into the scope of the 5th Anti-money Laundering Directive, the Commission may be seeking 
the further restriction of such activities in the EU. Companies operating in the above areas will 
have to continue to operate under legal uncertainty and pressure  at EU level and rely on na-
tional frameworks for some positive legal responses. 
 
c. The “same service, same rules” approach. 
 
The current EU strategy based on its official documents is to seek to incorporate, where 
possible, the less radical innovations into existing legal frameworks under the “same service, 
same rules” approach, which assumes that technology-enabled products and services are not 
sufficiently different to justify separate rules.  
In July 2019, ESMA published a report on the Licensing of Fintech Business Models
81
 in 
response to a relevant mandate given to it by the Fintech AP. The report contains the findings 
of two surveys conducted by ESMA in 2018 and 2019 to gather evidence from national compe-
tent authorities (NCAs) on the licensing regimes of Fintech firms.  The aim of the first survey 
was to identify gaps in EU regulatory frameworks in regards to Fintech licensing and the second 




 the application of the Commission’s principle of no distinction 
between traditional and fintech business models in regards to authorisations and licensing. Any 
distinction is based on financial activity and not on technology. NCAs confirmed that the appli-
cation for the principle allows existing EU frameworks to cover most of the fintech business 
models except ICOs and crypto-assets whose legal status remains undefined
83
.  NCAs also 
called for more clarity in regards to the definition of financial instruments within the existing 
framework
84
. NCAs requested EU guidance on these issues to avoid diverging applications of 
law at national level. 
These findings confirm the limits of the “same service, same rules” principle in regards to 
certain innovations. ESMA itself explained these limits in its Advice on Initial Coin Offerings 
 
81
 European Security and Markets Authority Report on the Licensing of Fintech Business Models, ESMA50-164-




 Ibid. Para.18. 
84
 Ibid. Para.19. 
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and Crypto-Assets of January 2019: “Because the range of crypto-assets are diverse and many 




Then, ESMA’s Advice proceeded to a classification of crypto-assets based on their com-
patibility with existing frameworks. The Advice concluded that certain types of crypto-assets 
would fall within existing frameworks, while other types would not. Although crypto-asset mar-
kets are modest in size, the absence of an accommodating framework is still in the opinion of 
this author, a gap which needs to be filled. Part of the reason for filling the gap is that the ab-
sence of a framework for crypto-assets and ICOs affects also the ecosystem which has been 
built around them such as crypto-asset exchanges. The regulation of the latter could come un-
der MiFID if crypto-assets qualify as financial instruments
86
, but could fall outside the scope of 
regulation if crypto-assets share the same fate. In addition, crypto-to-crypto exclusive services 




Finally, there is a strong incentive to bring these innovations in the scope of regulation 
due to the significance of DLT, the underlying technology, which can have beneficial applica-
tion beyond crypto-assets and ICOs. Leaving DLT unregulated could result in EU being left 
behind in the relevant international competition.  
 
 d.The application of the principles of proportionality and flexibility 
 
One way to address any fintech gap cases is through the application of the principles of 
proportionality and flexibility. Various EU documents, discussed earlier including Fintech AP, 
explicitly suggest to use proportionality to address FinTech issues. The principle is one of the 
fundamental ones in EU Law
88
, and requires EU action to be proportionate to the policy aim.  
Flexibility, in turn, allows the implementation of law in ways which allows to capture into exist-
ing frameworks unique or innovative solutions. The wide diversity of fintech business models 
and their significant geographical variations call into wider application of these to principles. 
However this approach is not without risks for the Commission. Given that fintech companies 
 
85
 European Security and Markets Authority Advice on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets ESMA50-157-
1391, 9 January (2019). 
86
 Supra n. 81, Para.46. 
87
 Ibid., Para.48. 
88
 It can be found in Article 5(4) of TFEU. 
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are currently regulated primarily at national level, with national regulators having the main over-
sight, the broad use of proportionality and flexibility could result in diverging interpretations at 
national level and regulatory arbitrage as national regulators are given freedom to make such 
decisions. Conversely, the reduction of flexibility could ensure more harmonisation, but would 
leave outside of the scope of regulation more fintech business models. The Commission may 
have to find a fine balance between the two potential risks and to do so it may have to place 
limits to the extent of flexibility in order to maintain a level playing field between Member 
States, which is a priority in the context of the Single Market. In addition, the fundamentally 
different business philosophy and structure of fintech business models compared to traditional 
ones covered by existing EU laws, places additional limits to the ability of NCAs and the Com-
mission to continue using existing frameworks ‘flexibly applied” in the context of fintech. The 
need for new frameworks and separate rules could become more pressing as fintech grows and 
the risks of diverging national frameworks grow with it.  
The second ESMA survey of NCAs
89
 confirms the above view. In this survey NCAs re-
ported that EU legal frameworks allowed them significant flexibility in their application nation-
ally of authorisation and licensing rules, but some of them noted that current EU frameworks 
were not made with these innovations in mind and that therefore they are ill-suited to cover 
some of the new business models
90
. There were also opposing views and whether more or less 
flexibility would be preferable in the context of fintech. Finally, ESMA did not recommend leg-
islative adjustments at this stage, claiming that NCAs could work with innovation facilitators (in-
novation hubs and regulatory sandboxes) to gather evidence on fintech and develop solutions, 
but left such a possibility open for the future. 
 It has to be noted that similar findings to ESMA were found in a relevant BCBS re-
search
91
. It was confirmed there that while most reporting authorities were happy  with the ap-
plication of existing criteria for banks to fintech, they also noted that many fintech models and 
products such as crowdfunding and digital currencies might not necessarily be covered by bank 
supervisors. This resulted in nearly half of regulatory authorities in the research considering 





 Supra n. 81. 
90Ibid. paras. 68-74. 
91
 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Implications of Fintech Developments for Banks and Bank Su-
pervisors (February 2018). 
92
 Ibid. 37. 
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The 2019 ESMA Advice on crypto-assets
93
 discussed also the possibility of developing an 
EU-wide bespoke regime for certain-types of crypto-assets falling out the scope of existing rules. 
Such a regime would tailor the bespoke rules to the type of risk involved in each case and po-
tentially offer different requirements in each case. An EU bespoke regime would  help to deter 
the creation of such regimes at national level, which would produce regulatory divergence and 
undermine the Single Market. It could offer a short term solution, but it could not offer the 
certainty the fintech and NCAs need.   
 
e.The “wait-and-see” approach as an impediment to fintech growth 
 
The unwillingness of the Commission to take more decisive and positive legislative action 
to accelerate fintech growth challenges the achievement of European Parliament’s goal for a 
“cross-sectoral, holistic” EU fintech framework, which will allow speedy fintech scale up and 
place EU to the position of a leading competitor employing “first mover” methods
94
. The over-
all impression of the Commission’s Fintech AP is that it seeks to address the market fragmenta-
tion problem of fintech slowly, while adopting a wait-and-see approach towards more radical 
(and potentially game-changing) fintech innovations. In such a context, the goal of creating a 
“holistic” fintech framework remains a longer-term one. The Commission does not seem to 
have concluded either on the type of regulation (static or dynamic, rule or principle based, pub-
lic or private regulation or mix of both etc) which will have to be used in the holistic framework 
it desires to create. Most initiatives highlighted in AP require legislative action and rule-based 
regulation although companies are encouraged to develop operational standardisation and im-
proved technological interoperability. 
Supporters of the current strategy could argue that although it is not optimal it still has 
certain short-term  advantages for EU and the industry: an unregulated fintech environment fa-
cilitates innovation and raises innovators’ short-term speed as they are not subject to any regula-
tory restrictions and they do not have to incur the costs of regulatory compliance. The absence 
of a comprehensive regulatory framework can also be justified in some cases given the in-
creased uncertainty about the technical features and prospects of many new technologies, 
which are still in early stage of development or continuously evolve. For example, the block-
chain technology used to support the crypto-assets, still faces speed and scalability problems, 
 
93
 Supra n. 85, paras. 182-187. 
94 Supra n. 35, para.4. 
 
ILIAS KAPSIS  23 
which challenges its ability to fully serve large markets such as payments
95
. Reliable assessment 
of market risks in such environments is difficult for any regulatory authority
96
 and therefore 
adopting regulations based on incomplete or inconclusive market data and speculative predic-
tions could cause unnecessary harm to the prospects of the European fintech industry by dis-
rupting its potential. The current size of fintech industry is not large enough to raise systemic 
risks
97
 and this could add further support for a more relaxed approach at this stage. 
For affected fintech companies the absence of EU-wide regulation prevents their compa-
nies from expanding their customer base as consumers hesitate to engage with unregulated 
products and services which offer limited consumer protection. In those cases, the existence of 
an EU framework establishing a minimum set of market rules will offer them legitimacy and 
enable these companies to grow while it will help to build a level playing field in the markets. 
The Commission’s fintech consultation which preceded the issuing of the AP found significant 
industry support for fintech frameworks operating under the "same service, same risk, same 
rule" principle for all market players
98
. As already discussed the application of the principle can 
be problematic in some cases given the fundamental differences between traditional and fintech 
business models, but can be beneficial for other cases. 
 
f. The case of crowdfunding 
 
Crowdfunding is an innovation where the Commission demonstrated a more decisive 
stance towards the adoption of a new, tailored-made, EU framework. Crowdfunding is a fast 
growing fintech industry, which offers alternative sources of finance. Crowdlending, a form of 
 
95 For more details see Peter J. Brown “Can Blockchain Power a Cashless World?, Asia Times, 15 Feb-
ruary, (2019) https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/02/article/can-blockchain-power-a-cashless-world/ [Ac-
cessed 28 November 2019]. However, these currently limitations are not expected to last long as pro-
jects are currently underway to improve blockchain speed and scalability. On the matter see also, Euro-
pean Central Bank and Bank of Japan, Payment Systems: Liquidity Saving Mechanisms in a Distributed 
Ledger Environment, September (2017), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/intro/mip-
online/2017/html/201709_article_stella.en.html [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
96 FSB in its Fintech Report supra n.16 at 1, explicitly admitted the regulators’ difficulties: “Currently, 
any assessment of the financial stability implications of Fintech is challenging given the limited availabil-
ity of official and privately disclosed data”. 
97 Ibid. 
98 European Commission Summary of Contributions to the 'Public Consultation on Fintech: a More 
Competitive and Innovative European financial sector’” (2017), available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/finance-2017-fintech_en [Accessed 28 November 2019]. Simi-
larly a KPMG Market Report found that EU regulations such as GDPR and PSD2 would increase in-
vestments in Fintech (KPMG,The Pulse of Fintech 2018, Biannual global analysis of investment in 
Fintech (2018), available at https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2018/07/pulse-of-fintech-h1-
2018.html) [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
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crowdfunding, involves peer-to-peer and peer-to-business lending through online platforms 
which act as market makers
99
. Crowd-lending includes large numbers of investors who invest 
small amounts of money, which are then packaged in larger loans by the platforms and offered 
to individuals and businesses. It shares many of the risks facing traditional lenders (e.g. low 
quality-borrowers), but also additional risks linked to its online nature (e.g. higher risk of fraud 
and money laundering due to web anonymity; difficulty establishing the competence of the 
business seeking the loan; disclosure risks for businesses who share business project infor-
mation with anonymous internet investors; cyber-security risks). The absence of effective regal 
frameworks makes difficult the protection of the rights of the parties. 
In previous studies, the Commission had acknowledged the significance of crowdfunding 
for the EU economy in general
100
 and for the achievement of important EU policy objectives in 
particular
101
, but it has also identified significant regulatory barriers linked to diverging and con-
flicting Member States’ legal regimes
102
. A 2018 crowdfunding report by Cambridge Centre of 
Alternative Finance (CCAF)
103
, found that significant market discontent from the absence of co-
herent EU regulation
104
. Previous EU studies
105
 also acknowledged as a problem the fact that the 
market was concentrated only in a few Member States. The Commission proposal included in 
the AP,  was for the adoption of a EU-wide passporting regime for crowdfunding. The Com-
mission also proposed as complementing measure the adoption of a new Directive amending 
 
99 See European Commission Legislative Proposal for an EU Framework on Crowd and Peer to Peer 
Finance” (2017), available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-
5288649_en [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
100 For example crowd-lending could improve access to finance for young and innovative companies such 
as those involved in Fintech, and for the broader group of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) of 
EU, which have faced significant access-to-finance problems after the financial crisis (see European 
Commission, Assessing the potential for crowdfunding and other forms of alternative finance to support 
research and innovation, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Final report - Study, Janu-
ary (2017). 
101 For example, Crowdlending can help to achieve one of the CMU flagship policy objectives to mobi-
lise capital and channel it to companies across the EU borders (see European Commission Identifying 
Market and Regulatory Obstacles to Cross-border Development of Crowdfunding in the EU” Final re-
port, December (2017), available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/171216-crowdfunding-re-
port_en.pdf [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Tania Ziegler Rotem Shneor Kieran Garvey, Karsten Wenzlaff Nikos Yerolemou Rui Hao Bryan 
Zhang Expanding Horizons” the 3rd European Alternative Industry Report, 
Cambridge Centre of Alternative Finance (2018), available at https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_up-
load/research/centres/alternative-finance/downloads/2018-ccaf-exp-horizons.pdf [Accessed 28 November 
2019]. 
104 See also Philippe Dorin and Martin Vojtko The European Journey of Alternative Lenders: Towards 
a Capital Markets Union? 33 J.I.B.L.R., 385 (2018).  
105 Garry A Gabison Understanding Crowdfunding and its Regulations, JRC Science and Policy Report, 
European Commission (2015), available at http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bit-
stream/JRC92482/lbna26992enn.pdf ;  
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Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments (MiFID 2). These are steps in the 
right direction but attention should be paid to ensuring that compliance costs will not be stifling 
crowdfunding development. 
 
g.The challenge of crypto-assets 
 
The difficulties associated with the regulation of crypto-assets have already been ex-
plained. It will be added here that these innovations do not only offer fundamentally different 
financial products and business models, but they also challenge the core of regulatory doctrines 
and principles on  which the current regulatory regimes, national and international alike, have 
been build.  For example, many crypto-assets, rely on decentralisation of process control, finan-
cial disintermediation and broad anonymity, while their worldwide spread through the internet 
create significant jurisdictional issues
106
. Many of the individuals and companies involved in 
cryptocurrency markets, especially issuers, technology controllers and users, do not meet the 
traditional criteria for regulated entities
107
 and are often hard to identify. An approach, which 
gains favour between lawmakers is to target through regulation more visible and stable market 
components such as cryptocurrency exchanges and e-wallets or specific activities of regulated 
entities in cryptocurrencies markets
108
. EU is active in this area with gradual incorporation of 
certain crypto-asset activities in the scope of regulation. In 2018 the Commission included vir-
tual currency trading platforms and hosted wallets, which are linked to crypto-assets in the 
scope of the 5th Anti-Money laundering Directive
109
 and in its 2019 Advice on crypto-assets
110
, 
already discussed, ESMA advised that several types of these assets could come under existing 
regulation, but this does not mean that all issues have been resolved. EU, like its competitors, 
still lacks effective solutions to the core challenges raised by these assets, especially decentralisa-
tion, disintermediation and anonymity. Any solution in these cases to be effective, should come 
 
106 For the current work of FSB on crypto-assets and the challenges faced by international regulators see 
Financial Stability Board, Crypto-asset markets, Potential channels for future financial stability implica-
tions, 10 October (2018), available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P101018.pdf [Accessed 28 
November 2019]. 
107 Ibid. 
108 See FSB report supra n. 106 at 4.1; also Benoît Cœuré Fintech for the People, Keynote speech at the 
14th BCBS-FSI high-level meeting for Africa on strengthening financial sector supervision and current 
regulatory priorities, Cape Town, 31 January (2019), available at https://www.ecb.eu-
ropa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp190131~24b8e3fb49.en.html [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
109 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU. 
110
 Supra n. 85. 
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from international regulators, and the Commission’s AP promises to bring the matter to these 
bodies. While this seems to be the correct approach to the problem, due to the global nature 
of crypto-assets, there is no guarantee of success given the lack of global consensus about how 
these assets should be regulated. Currently each country goes its own way and the Commis-
sion’s focus on international efforts may result in EU being left behind if international rules are 
not created within a reasonable period. Absence of EU initiatives may also undermine the Sin-
gle Market in crypto asset markets by allowing national regulatory divergence. Crypto-assets and 
DLT is an area where EU could lead by creating an innovative framework for their regulation, 
which other jurisdictions could follow. 
 
h. The risk of excessive legal barriers 
 
The efforts to bring fintech under EU regulatory controls could result in a situation of 
where excessive legal barriers would be created stifling innovation. Fintech companies and tra-
ditional banks routinely blame expansive EU regulation as a factor raising barriers to innova-
tion and competition in the industry. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Mar-
kets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), Revised Payment Service Directive (PSD2), 
and EU AML laws are mentioned in industry surveys
111
. These laws contain a number of re-
strictions for fintech companies and incumbents with the aim of protecting consumers and mar-
ket stability, which are top EU priorities. Although there is a convincing argument, supported 
also by the industry, that the existence of a regulatory framework containing clear principles 
would also add legitimacy and help fintech to grow, there is also an equally convincing argu-
ment that due to its innovative features, fintech demonstrates significant differences from tradi-
tional banks, which should be treated differently to avoid stifling innovation. the multiplicity of 
laws also undermines the ability of EU regulators to apply flexibility in the implementation of 
the rules to help fintech grow.  
A different but related problem concerns the implementation of the fintech-friendly 
measures included in the recent legislation. There is evidence that some fintech-friendly 
 
111 See e.g the PwC Global Fintech Report supra n. 8. 
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measures such as those included in PSD2 face resistance from incumbent banks, which are un-
willing to share customer data with their new competitors
112
. Incumbent resistance is to be ex-
pected as incumbents seek to defend their markets positions, but their resistance in combina-
tion with restrictive legal frameworks in other areas could create insurmountable entry barriers 
to innovation.  
Regtech, which uses innovative technology-enabled solutions to help companies comply 
with their regulatory obligations and regulators to obtain market data in real time, which they 
can then use to create targeted responses, could be used to reduce the risk of excessive regula-
tion. Regtech can trigger market interventions only when and where needed.  The Fintech AP 
does not contain specific initiatives about regtech, although some of the actions included in the 
AP (such as data sharing) imply the use of regtech. Regtech will become a big issue in the fu-
ture for both companies and regulators and EU should ensure that it remains in the frontline of 
the developments. 
 
6. Designing an effective future-oriented fintech legal framework for EU 
 
Any effective EU legal framework for fintech should incorporate the lessons from previ-
ous financial crisis and the signals sent from the markets. It is therefore important to highlight 
first some of these lessons. 
 
a. The post-crisis landscape in traditional EU financial markets 
 
The last financial crisis revealed a situation of under-regulation in the financial markets 
and a regulatory regime fragmented along national or regional lines
113
. It also revealed a wide-
 
112
 ECB cites resistance from incumbent banks to granting technical access to new and innovative pay-
ment service providers in line with PSD2 requirements (see Yves Mersch Strengthening the European 
financial industry amid disruptive global challenges, Speech at the European Institute of Financial Regu-
lation (EIFR), Paris, 3 September (2018)). 
113 See e.g. the Lord Turner’s Report about the causes of the banking crisis in UK and internationally 
(The Turner Review A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis, Financial Services Authority, 
March (2009)). For an EU assessment of the crisis see Liikanen Group Report (High-level Expert 
Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector, Final Report, Brussels, 2 October 
(2012), available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/liikanen-report-02102012_en.pdf). [Accessed 
28 November 2019]. 
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spread culture of greed and corruption in the financial sector, which undermined market stabil-
ity
114
. The post-crisis reforms built a new regulatory and supervisory legal architecture, which 
was more interventionist and contained better international cooperation to restore market sta-
bility, improve the protection of investors and consumers and deal with the problem of bank 
culture. EU led in these efforts. Currently regulators routinely claim
115
 that the financial system 
is more resilient than before, and the consumers are better protected. This claim even if true, 
came at a significant cost for both banks and the consumers. Banks face serious regulatory re-
strictions in their activities and substantial compliance costs
116
, while consumers face higher 
transaction costs and more difficult access to finance and credit
117
. 
Fintech companies exploited the situation by offering excluded or underserved consum-
ers the products and services that traditional banks were unable or unwilling to offer. To do so 
these companies avoided direct entry into mainstream finance, which had high legal entry barri-
ers and where incumbents had strong business advantage and preferred instead to use innova-
tion to build parallel, technology-enabled, market-driven financial ecosystems, which are either 
unregulated or lightly regulated and therefore, more flexible.  
The rise of fintech is only one part, currently small one, of a much broader global trend, 
which has seen non-bank financial institutions
118
 growing since the financial crisis at a much 
faster rate than banks and reaching 30 recent of total financial assets. In the eurozone banks 
 
114 For a discussion of the culture of greed and corruption in the industry post crisis see I.Kapsis "Sticks 
or Carrots? How to make British Banks more Socially Responsible", 40 Business Law Review 38 
(2019). 
115 See e.g. the FSB 2018 report on the reforms claiming that ten years after the financial crisis, large 
banks were “much better capitalised, less leveraged and more liquid”. (Financial Stability Board Imple-
mentation and Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms, 4th Annual Report, 28 November 
(2018), available at http://www.fsb.org/2018/11/implementation-and-effects-of-the-g20-financial-regula-
tory-reforms-fourth-annual-report/) [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
116 Estimates about the cost of bank compliance vary considerably with some industry sources putting the 
relevant figure to $270 billion worldwide. Other estimates put compliance costs at 4% of the 
banks’ total revenue, with further projected rise to 10% by 2022 (Lucy McNulty, Compliance 
costs to more than double by 2022, Financial News, 27 April (2017); Peter Farley Spotlight on Compli-
ance Costs as Banks Get down to Business with AI, International Banker, 4 July (2017)). Despite the 
varying estimates, there is a consensus in the industry that compliance costs are substantial. 
117 Despite low interests rates post-crisis helping to keep cost of credit relatively low and improved the 
credit availability (see e.g. FSB report, supra n. 115, at 26), many consumers and small businesses have 
complained over more limited access to it caused by more rigid rules about access to finance for certain 
market groups caused by financial stability concerns. 
118 The latest FSB Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation supra n. 7 reports 
that banks (defined as “deposit-taking institutions’) saw their share of total financial assets globally de-
clining from 45 percent in 2008 to 39 percent in 2017, whereas the share of other financial institutions 
increased from 26 percent to 31 percent. in 2017 banks grow at 2.8 percent compared to 7.7 percent of 
non-banks. 
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saw their share of the total market falling from 66 percent in 2008 to 37 percent in 2017
119
, with 
biggest winners being shadow banks and non-banks (e.g. equity funds, finance companies, com-
panies dealing with securities and derivatives etc) whose share climbed from 22 percent to 48 
percent
120
. Part of this development could be attributed to the cost of the crisis for the business 
models of incumbents due to regulatory restrictions and competition from outside sources, 
such as fintech. The rise of non-bank, market-driven finance in the post-crisis environment is 
not a new development as market finance tends to increase at the expense of banking finance 
as the economies and capital markets grow, which has happened as these markets and econo-
mies recovered from the financial crisis
121
. Although the relevant literature is not conclusive on 
whether bank finance or market finance are superior in fostering economic growth, there is 
some recent evidence that market finance is more effective at promoting innovation and 
productivity, as well as finding innovative sources of growth
122
. Europe needs financial innova-
tion to accelerate the growth of the lagging EU economy now that EU banks face challenges. 
Fintech, despite scaling issues and the use of often untested technologies and business models 
has the potential to offer it. 
 It has to be noted that despite fintech and other competitor intrusions, the size of the Eu-
ropean banking sector is still larger than that of its peers
123
 and within it large universal banks 
continue to have a dominant market role. Their size has further grown since the crisis leading 
to a more concentrated banking market
124
. Universal banks have the advantage of flexibility re-
garding the offers to consumers as their business model allows them to select from a wide range 
of financial products and services, but they are also more formalistic and bureaucratic. Those 
denied access face broader exclusion as bank interconnectivity and harmonised regulations 
 
119 ZEB European Banking Study Navigating the Road Ahead-Market Trends & Strategic Options for 
European Banks (2018), available at https://www.ebf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/ZEB-European-
Banking-Study-2018.pdf [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
120 Ibid. 
121 See European Central Bank Financial Integration in Europe, May, (2018). 
122 Ibid. 
123 The Liikanen Report supra n. 113 at 12-13, noted that EU banks total assets reached 350% of EU 
GDP in 2008 when the crisis hit compared with 78% in US and 174% in Japan. Although the crisis 
slowed down European total banking assets growth, they still exceed the size of the bans of EU competi-
tors. For more recent updates on the situation in the European banking structures and assets see  Euro-
pean Central Bank Report on Financial Structures, October (2017); European Banking Federation, 
Banking in Europe: EBF Facts & Figures 2018, available at https://www.ebf.eu/facts-and-figures/ [Ac-
cessed 28 November 2019]. 
124 The increased role of large universal banks is the result of the continuing decline in the number Euro-
pean banks from 9,771 in 2010 to 7,246 in 2017 – a drop of over 2,500 (see ZEB study supra n. 117 at 
15). See also the FSB finding that the last financial crisis has slowed down but not reversed the trend to-
wards more consolidation in the financial industry (FSB Report on Financial Regulatory Reforms supra 
n. 113, 26). 
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deny excluded customers alternatives. Large universal banks have also complex structure, 
which makes it harder to achieve significant efficiencies or respond fast to competitive pres-
sures
125
, but regulators in EU and elsewhere prefer them as they are deemed more stable and 
the cost of regulating them is lower
126
. The complex structure and size of universal banks make 
the updating of IT systems and the achievement of digital transformation more expensive and 
more time consuming. As a result, many universal banks continue to run on out-of-date IT sys-
tems
127
, which makes them vulnerable to attacks from more efficient competitors who use more 
flexible business models and more advanced technologies. In addition, EU universal banks 
face low profitability driven initially by the costs of recovery and regulatory burdens after the 
financial crisis and later by the prolonged period of low interest rates
128
. EU bank profitability is 
currently at historically low levels with post-tax return on equity being lower than the cost of eq-
uity and this despite all-time lows with regard to loan loss provisions
129
. Market valuations also 
remain at crisis levels
130
. European bank performance lags behind their international competi-
tors especially in US and China
131
. Incumbents, in various industry surveys
132
 appear to be more 
optimistic about the future where they expect improved profits and higher growth, but market 
analysts consider it difficult without major changes in their business models, given the rising 
costs and competition pressures they are facing
133
. Some industry experts propose
134
 a new wave 
of cross-border bank consolidation in Europe through mergers and acquisitions,  as a way to 
develop synergies and improve profitability, but the results of past consolidation efforts had not 
 
125 For a relevant discussion see A. Saunders and I. Walter Reworking the Global Financial Architecture: 
is Universal Banking the Best Way Forward?, 1 The Journal of Financial Perspectives  1 (2013). 
126 Ibid. 
127 See e.g. the survey carried out by EY and reported in EY Global Banking Outlook 2018, available at 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-global-banking-outlook-2018/$File/ey-global-banking-
outlook-2018.pdf [Accessed 28 November 2019]. 
128 See EBA 2018 report, supra n..27, at 9-10. 
129 ZEB European Banking Study supra n.119. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. at 12. 
132 See e.g. the survey results reported in EY market report supra n. 127.  
133 See e.g. Ibid. The ZEB European Banking Study op.cit.119. at 22 citing market sources, reports that 
the industry expects a 18 percent increase in IT costs alone between 2016 and 2021. This shows how 
difficult is the task incumbents are facing in cutting costs and improving their margins. Also, EBA report 
supra n. 27 identifies a range of factors associated with fintech, which could threaten the viability of in-
cumbent banks’ business models. 
134 See ZEB European Banking Study Supra n. 119, at 17. 
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always promising
135
 and the existence of significant national barriers, which still remain, make 
any future efforts also uncertain about their outcome
136
.  
Regulators have made considerable efforts and allocated vast resources to stabilise the tra-
ditional banks and seem to prefer the current market structure which favours them, but the risk 
of contagion and damage to the economy from these too-big-to-fail institutions has not been 
eliminated. Large universal banks survived the last financial crisis, with significant taxpayer as-
sistance, but they may not be able to survive the next one. Their low profitability and inefficien-
cies in period of growth guarantee hard times for them in future crisis. Any future crisis linked 
to these banks could result in them being targeted “as a malignant institutional form that tends 
to ‘manufacture’ systemic risk”
137
. Moreover, phenomena of greed and corruption, which had 
major contribution to the creation of the last financial crisis continue to plague the incumbents, 
further increasing the social and economic costs for banks and undermining the regulators’ ef-
forts
138
.   
Currently, fintech competitors do not seek to dethrone incumbents and are focused more 
on serving customers excluded or underserved by the traditional banks and the level of compe-
tition between the two groups is not intense in all markets, but the situation may change in the 
future as fintech companies grow and expand their business portfolios
139
. Fintech companies are 
smaller in size, more flexible and they do not carry skeletons in their wardrobes such as the bad 
loan portfolios of traditional banks which still burden them
140
. They can also easily adapt their 
business models to market conditions compared to incumbents who are constrained by their 
 
135 The failure of certain large cross-border banking mergers such as the failed acquisition of Dutch Bank 
ABN Amro by a banking consortium comprising the UK Bank Royal Bank of Scotland, Belgian bank 
Fortis and Spanish bank Banco Santander, led to major market turbulence and government interven-
tion during the financial crisis.     
136 There are still a lot of local barriers in European banking markets caused by political, legal and eco-
nomic (e.g. tax) differences between member states. 
137 Saunders and Walter supra n.125. 
138 Bloomberg in 2017 estimated that global banks paid 321 billion in fines since 2008. See Richard 
Partington Banks Trimming Compliance Staff as $321 Billion in Fines Abate, Bloomberg, 23 March 
2017.  
139 The 2018 study on Fintech competition op.cit.7 did not identify competition problems from the cur-
rent market activities of fintech companies and conventional banks, as the two sides seem to have differ-
ent market priorities: fintech companies have stronger presence in underserved markets where they pro-
mote financial inclusion whereas they have more limited role in mature markets where they seek to im-
prove the user experience thus having a role, which complements existing offerings. Also EBA supra n. 
27, at 15. 
140 See the Fintech Competition report ibid. 
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legacy IT systems, absence of expertise and existing staff resistance to change
141
. These ad-
vantages have allowed them to grow fast in significant financial markets, such as retail banking, 
at the expense of incumbents. Big tech or retail companies, such as Alibaba, Apple and Ama-
zon, which form another group of non-bank competitors linked to fintech, exploit their own 
established global networks of clients and existing infrastructure from retail operations to inte-
grate efficiently financial services and products within their existing business portfolios. For 
these companies financial solutions are not currently in their top priorities, but instead they use 
them to support their core IT or retail businesses. From a competition point of view big tech 
and big retail have the resources to provoke significant competition which could hurt incum-
bents.   
The future landscape of financial services markets in Europe will be determined by the 
outcome of competition between strategic groups (traditional banks, fintech startups and big 
tech/retail companies) as the above. Other financial institutions (e.g. hedge funds, equity funds, 
etc) could also contribute. The role of technology will be crucial for all these groups as most 
competitive advantages will be technology and data driven.  
Overall, the lessons from the financial crisis and the reforms that followed is that Euro-
pean banking is currently more stable and remain dominant in Europe, but their dominance is 
weakened and their longer-term ability to maintain its market positions is in serious doubt be-
cause the regulatory constraints and technological advances which benefit more their competi-
tors. 
EU regulators will have to take these developments into account when designing long-
term regulatory policies. Existing market assumptions  on which current regulatory regimes are 
based may soon become obsolete. 
 
b. Principles of a future-oriented framework which would transform EU financial mar-
kets. 
 
The analysis in the preceding section showed that achieving a leadership position may not 
be just a choice for EU, but a necessity given the weaknesses of European incumbent banks.  
 
141 EBA, supra n. 27, at p.14,18. Upgrading the legacy IT systems which still support the core of many 
traditional institutions is the main current concern of many European Banks. However, IT system up-
grades cannot compare with the radical innovation of fintech companies which can test and quickly 
adopt latest IT innovations based on AI and other sources. Staff lack of innovation expertise and mind-
set in incumbent banks are deemed as impediments to implementation of innovation. 
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To achieve a leadership status EU regulators may have to rethink their approach to finan-
cial regulation. The EU past record demonstrates robust consumer and privacy laws, compre-
hensive financial stability and market integrity frameworks and a bold antitrust regime, which 
has not hesitated to use all its available tools to constrain the behaviour of big tech, where it 
threatens the level playing field
142
.  While the EU achievements  in these fields are commenda-
ble they are not be enough to secure EU’s place as a global leader in the era of fintech and big 
tech. Fintech requires a different approach, a new philosophy of regulation bolder than that 
presented in the Commission’s AP.  Some elements of this new philosophy and corresponding 
legal framework are presented below: 
 
i. Embrace the future by relaxing the protection of status quo 
 
It is submitted that EU regulators, instead of trying to preserve the status quo, by subject-
ing fintech into existing frameworks made with traditional banks in mind, they should opt for 
new regulatory solutions exclusive to fintech, because this is the best way to allow fintech to 
grow and also to address chronic problems of traditional finance. Fintech has operational ad-
vantages (especially technological and operational autonomy and scalability) and can produce 
genuine innovation, which could allow it to create viable alternatives to existing business mod-
els, products and market structures. The result would be a more diverse financial ecosystem 
than the current, which would offer a far broader range of products and services and will con-
sist of incumbents, incumbent-fintech partnerships, standalone fintech and big tech. The role 
of traditional banks will be reduced. But to do so fintech needs appropriate regulation which 
will create a level playing field with the incumbents. 
The decision of EU and national regulators to regulate activity and not business model, 
which was discussed earlier, is a step in the right direction as it allows fintech business models 
to be developed without facing legal barrier exclusions. The regulation by activity where same 
rules apply for all (incumbents and fintech alike) is more appropriate as it focuses on what 
companies offer to consumers and seek to apply same standards ensuring a level playing field. 
But this approach has also its limits. 
For example payments in fiat currency and payments in cryptocurrencies are both “pay-
ment” activities, but they are conducted under fundamentally different processes (e.g, bank net-
 
142
 A series of Commission actions against big tech (Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Apple) confirms the Commis-
sion’s commitment to the level playing field. 
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works are used for fiat currency payments when this is not required for cryptocurrency pay-
ments which are peer-to-peer) using fundamental different currencies (central-bank-issued cur-
rencies versus privately issued ones). Under current rules, payments in fiat currency are fully 
regulated, but payments in crypto-currencies are not. The application of same rules for all pay-
ments does not seem to create a level playing field here because the exclusion of the crypto-as-
set linked payments (as they fall out of existing law) benefits fiat currency incumbents and this 
cannot be compensated by the use of bespoke regimes for fintech as proposed by ESMA. 
Cryptocurrency payments need their own equivalent rules which will offer them legitimacy and 
a fair chance to compete against fiat currency payments. 
The example shows the limits of activity-based regulation, which, it has been argued, ‘… 
does not represent, by itself, the silver bullet that could preserve the robustness of the regula-
tory framework in the new technological environment’
143
.  
The decision to relax support of status quo by treating financial markets as more diverse 
ecosystems comprising both fintech and incumbents and not as incumbent-dominated ones, is 
not an easy one as there may be significant operational implications for regulation, but if the 
Commission wishes to build a competitive advantage for its financial services it may have to fol-
low this path. 
 
 
ii.Accept new market structures with separate rules 
 
 The adoption of separate regulatory rules as a result of abandoning the reliance on in-
cumbent models, will inevitably result also in the creation in some cases, where operational, 
procedural and technological autonomy allow it, of structurally separate markets for fintech. 
Crypto-assets, ICOs and DLT are immediate candidates for participating in separate markets, 
but more such candidates are likely to emerge in the future, such as artificial intelligence (in 
particular products and services based on machine learning) and smart contracts.  
The creation of structurally separate and autonomous market segments may also help to 
reduce overall financial sector systemic risks, which remain high, despite repeated public reas-
surances, in the current incumbent-dominated markets. As long as ‘too-big-to fail’ institutions 
and phenomena of excessive risk taking, greed and corruption remain in the traditional finan-
cial sector, the latter will be always a source of systemic risk.  
 
143
 Fernando Restoy Regulating Fintech: What is Going on, and Where are the Challenges? Bank of International 
Settlements, Speech, Washington DC, (16 October 2019).  
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This author is sceptical about the market impact of some of the incumbent-fintech part-
nerships. The history of mergers in the banking sector especially in the run up to the last finan-
cial crisis showed that
144
 many of these mergers decisions were hastily made from partners re-
sponding to market and shareholder pressures for quick profits and therefore many lacked 
strategic value leading to the creation of large, inefficient banks
145
. The addition of innovative 
products, such as complex mortgage derivatives and the use of technology to evaluate and man-
age these products and market risks created, instead, explosive risks which led to the financial 
crisis
146
. EU regulators should learn from the past experience and take steps to protect the pro-
posed separation by discouraging the incumbents’ deep involvement with fintech companies 
and markets in large scale mergers and market entries
147
. Incumbents need fintech solutions to 
improve their business models and incumbent-fintech partnerships should be encouraged 
where this is the purpose, but where the partnership aims at creating new, hybrid business 
models and products or large scale entry from one market to the other, more detailed scrutiny 
may be required as a way to prevent systemic risks spreading between the two markets. 
Some fintech innovations including disintermediation and blockchain, can be adopted 
successfully by incumbents within their existing business models. In other cases, though, inno-
vative fintech solutions can not be replicated by the far larger and complex incumbent banks
148
. 
Regulation should encourage banks to adopt fintech at a pace which will allow them to manage 
effectively the risks associated with the new technologies. This encouragement should be linked 
to the establishment of clearer and measurable criteria for evaluating the fintech risks for in-
cumbent business models. Currently incumbents face uncertainty about the regulators’ require-
ments. An EY 2018 industry report
149
 found that banks face serious difficulties measuring risks 
from cybersecurity, technology and information security, which are also linked to fintech and 
suggest that incumbents look to regulators for more guidance. The Commission’s Fintech AP 
promises significant initiatives in the direction of improving cybersecurity, which will contribute 
to the improve stability and resilience of IT systems, but the problem of measuring IT risks 
 
144 See the analysis of the benefits and costs from the creation of large banks in Liikanen Report supra n. 
113, at Annex 4. 
145 As the Liikanen Report analysis ibid. showed, the further efficiencies are more difficult when banks 
reach very large size. 
146 See e.g. ibid. at 13-14; Turner Review supra n. 113, at 1.1. 
147
 New risks  from the fintech mergers could include, inter alia, operational risks, financial risks from the 
investment in the new market and the association with more unstable Fintech partners, increased cyber 
risks, reputation risks and. For more details analysis see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision su-
pra n. 91. 
148 Dealing with the legacy IT systems, lack of specialised and Fintech-savvy staff are often cited between the 
reasons. (see PwC Global Fintech Report supra n. 8). 
149 See Ninth Annual EY/IIF survey supra n. 9. 
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and the adequacy of the banks’ available responses remains. The development of solutions by 
regtech, which can serve both regulators and banks could offer assistance, but more investment 
in regtech will be needed.  
Without clarification about the criteria and standards for cybersecurity and other fintech-
related risks it will be difficult for incumbents to accelerate their fintech transformation. The 
problem of dealing with cybersecurity risks is a broader one going beyond financial services 
and currently there are no hacker-proof solutions and they are unlikely to be ones in the fore-
seeable future. This, in this author’s opinion, strengthens the case for the building, longer-term, 
alternative financial ecosystems, which could operate on different (but related) IT infrastructure 
and which could continue functioning when the main one is disrupted as a result of cyberat-
tacks.  
Alternatively, regulators could require structural market separation (following the exam-
ple of UK ring-fencing
150
) of the fintech activities of the banks from the more traditional ones. 
There is an argument, based on some empirical evidence that the regulatory benefits from 
measures like ‘ring-fencing’ or other structural separation (including break-up of large banks) 
would be offset by the costs of the structural separation and the resulted erosion of financial 
system performance
151
. The UK Independent Commission on Banking (ICB)
152
, which pro-
posed the ring-fencing for British banks, saw significant benefits from it by helping to sort out 
the banking system in periods of crisis and by insulating vital banking services for the econ-
omy
153
. EU opted against such a solution for European banks
154
 but it is submitted that, for the 
fintech with autonomous function any ringfencing-equivalent measure would be easier to imple-
ment as banks are not yet in these markets and fintech presence in traditional markets is not 
strong. So the cost lot separation could be small. 
 
iii. Consistency is possible with different sets of rules 
 
 
150 A decision was made as a result of the financial crisis by UK government to bring legislation which 
would require from large UK banks to separate their retail banking activities from the rest of their busi-
nesses. Ringfencing was implemented in January 2019, and Prudential Regulation Authority has the 
main responsibility (for more details about the new rules see K. Britton, L. Dawkes, S. Debbage and T. 
Idris Ring-Fencing: What is it and How Will it Affect Banks and their Customers?”, Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin Q4, 164 (2016).  
151Saunders and Walter supra n. 125, at p.11. 
152 See Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report, September 2011. 
153 Ibid. at 35. 
154 See the recommendations of the de Larosière Group The High-Level Group of Financial Supervision 
in the EU, Report, Brussels, 25 February (2009).   
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EBA claims
155
 that the existence of a consistent legal framework is essential to ensure mar-
ket stability and a level-playing field. EBA also considers regulatory consistency as one of the 
key lessons from the last financial crisis
156
. But consistency does not necessarily require same 
sets of rules for all. It is possible to have separate rules, if there is clarity about the boundaries 
of each framework and they apply consistently. 
The Commission has already acknowledged the need for new regulatory frameworks 
aimed for fintech alone. In the Fintech Credit Institution Licence Guide, the ECB was quick to 
stress that the Guide was not aimed at subjecting that fintech banks to different assessment cri-
teria, but in the Feedback Statement the ECB also acknowledged, that fintech banks have spe-
cial features, which have to be addressed separately from other banks
157
.  
Longer term, consistency can be achieved by replacing the “same criteria” approach with 
an “equivalence” or proportionality principle. It is submitted that markets are more interested 
to see what the rules of the game are and would expect a neutral and fair treatment of all com-
petitors, but fairness does not necessarily require equality. Fair treatment and level playing field 
can be achieved also through different rules especially where competing products are not ho-
mogeneous. 
For example, both fintech and traditional banks face the risk of non-performing loans but 
the size and cause of risk can be different as the two groups use different credit scoring systems 
(many fintech companies use innovative credit scoring mechanisms). There are also asset valua-
tion differences between traditional banks and e.g. crypto-banks and different risk profiles 
(fintech relies more on technology) which would result in different methods of risk quantifica-
tion. So while consistency in the application of the rules in essential, it does not necessarily re-
quire the use of same rules for each case. 
 
 
iv. Accept the possibility of relaxing consumer and investor protection rules 
 
The European Parliament Report on Fintech: the Influence of Technology on the Future of the 
Financial Sector158, para 45 reads: “….the same consumer protection standards apply to Fintech services 
as to other financial services, irrespective of the channel of distribution or the location of the customer”. 
 
155 Supra n..44; see also European Parliament Report on Fintech: the Influence of Technology on the 
Future of the Financial Sector, supra n. 35, para 45. 
156 Ibid. 
157 See the ECB response included in the Feedback Statement on the Guide supra n. 66. 
158
 Supra n.35. 
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The insistence on this principle may hinter longer term the development not only of 
fintech, but also of financial services and act against other stated policy priorities such as finan-
cial inclusion. strict consumer protection laws could result in consumers being denied access to 
finance, such as loans and credit cards. While it is legitimate for regulators to make sure that 
consumers are effectively protected from market abuses, it is also paramount to ensure that all 
consumers are protected, which in turn implies that all consumers have access to finance and 
the protection. But this is clearly not the case, at least due to the exclusion (partial or complete) 
of certain types of consumers. Existing consumer laws and bank regulations could share part of 
the blame for consumers feeling excluded or underserved as the cost of restrictions is more ex-
pensive and less inclusive finance. The current rapid growth of unregulated fintech solutions in 
various parts of EU and in UK is evidence that absence of regulation can help serve consumers 
and businesses excluded from the regulated sector. It is also evidence of a clear preference in 
some consumers and businesses to trade part of their protection for more financial inclusion 
and better service.   
The creation of structurally separate markets with autonomous functions proposed earlier 
would allow the Commission to demonstrate some flexibility in regards to the standards of con-
sumer protection. The Commission for example could accept some anonymity e.g. in e-wallets 
and allow without control certain lower-value fintech transactions. 
 
v. Use more principle-based and more private regulation 
 
EU Regulators could also resort to more principle-based regulation and allow more pri-
vate regulation. Principle-based regulation relies heavily on soft law (e.g. guidelines) and self-
regulation, which is useful when dealing with innovations for which regulators have limited 
knowledge. Some countries such as Switzerland
159
, which is between the world leaders in em-
bracing fintech, already use principle-based regulation to deal in a flexible way with the fintech 
challenge. For Switzerland a Federal Council Report of December 2018
160
, summarised the 
country’s principle-based approach to the regulation of blockchain and distributed ledger tech-
nology, as follows: “[t]he principle-based approach supports technological neutrality by crafting 
rules specifying which goal or impact should be achieved, but providing leeway where possible 
 
159 For the Swiss approach to Fintech regulation see FINMA FINMA, Reduces Obstacles to Fintech”, 
Press Release, 17 March (2017). 
160 See Federal Council Legal framework for distributed ledger technology and blockchain in Switzer-
land, Report, Bern, 7 December (2018).  
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for how to achieve this in detail”
161
. The Report also highlighted some other principles
162
, which 
demonstrate the Swiss flexibility about fintech: a bottom-up approach letting market and society 
decide with public policy having a supporting role; b. targeted adjustments to existing legal 
frameworks to accommodate blockchain; c. technology-neutral approach; legal certainty, clear 
rules and combating abuse; d. openness and dialogue with the fintech industry. EU regulators
163
, 
similar to their Swiss counter-parties, have accepted the broad adoption of technology-neutral 
approach and the possibility of using a more principle-based regulation, which will help them 
to regulate a wider range of companies and make financial markets more inclusive, but the EU 
approach in regards to the principe-based regulation is less enthusiastic, reflecting the historic 
EU cautiousness on the matter. There is still a question of how the Commission will combine 
any principle-based policy, which would help foster innovation with other declared goals, such 
as that of financial stability and ensuring the same level of protection for consumers and inves-
tors for which rules-based regulation is normally used. The inclusion of fintech to the scope of 
GDPR, the 5th anti-money laundering directive and other hard-law instruments indicates the 
Commission’s decision not to abandon rules-based regulation at least in areas such as con-
sumer protection. Also letting markets and society to decide does not seem to be in the Com-
mission’s agenda either. 
It is submitted that for market leadership EU will have to use principle-based regulation 
more often. For example for DLT, crypto-assets and ICOs adoption of principle based solu-
tions are preferable to the alternative of leaving the matter to Member States or seeking be-
spoke solutions. 
In regards to private (or self) regulation, the Commission’s AP, makes several mentions 
to self-regulation especially in regards to the development of industry standards and also calls 
for closer cooperation with the industry. These calls, while positive should be supported by 
concrete steps such as those adopted in Japan where in October 2018 the government ap-
 
161
 Ibid. at 1.3. 
162
 Ibid. 
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pointed the Japan Virtual Currency Exchange Association, a private body, responsible for regu-
lating cryptoassets
164
.  The Japanese government justified its decision on the basis that the indus-
try has better knowledge of the technical aspects and the complexities of these innovations and 




vi. Make increasing use of competition law 
 
Public authorities should also rigorously apply competition laws in fintech markets and 
the broader financial services sector not only in order to prevent anti-competitive practices 
from fintech innovators, but also in order to deter the gradual takeover of fintech markets by 
the more resourceful incumbent banks or big tech. Currently, from competition authorities’ 
perspective
166
 there are no major competition issues in fintech markets as these markets are 
greatly fragmented and incumbents’ presence is not strong, but later, risks to competition could 
emerge, especially as big tech joins the competition. 
 
vii. The cost of regulation in the new era can be low 
 
Some could argue that putting in place separate regulatory principles and mechanisms for 
fintech companies would increase the overall regulatory costs, but this may not end up being 
the case if the growth of alternative finance results in shrinking of the traditional financial sector 
and if the regulation of the alternative markets is less restrictive, complex and costly than in tra-
ditional finance. Also, a significant advantage of certain fintech technologies such as blockchain 
is that they tend to simplify financial processes and make them more efficient. This by itself 
could result in simpler, lower-cost regulatory frameworks.  A cost/benefit analysis of having a 
more diverse regulatory framework compared to the current one will prove useful. 
 
  




 See Taiga Uranaka Japan grants cryptocurrency industry self-regulatory status Reuters 24 October (2018). 
165
 Ibid. 
166 See EU Fintech competition study supra n. 10. 
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An EY 2018 Ninth EY/IIF global risk management survey
167
 found that for European 
banks implementing regulations and meeting supervisory expectations are two of the top priori-
ties of their boards. Regarding fintech, the banking industry has a set of demands from regula-
tors. These include
168
 more regulatory and supervisory certainty around the deployment of new 
technologies; to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial system; to clarify risk manage-
ment expectations around new technologies; to clarify privacy/information security expectations 
around new technologies; to create a level playing field between existing and new firms and 
competitors; to clarify third-party risk management expectations around new technologies; to 
ensure compliance with laws, rules and regulations; to clarify cyber-risk expectations around 
new technologies.  
For EU building an effective legal framework for fintech has acquired some urgency given 
the lower profitability of European banks compared with their international peers and the mar-
ket lead on fintech, which the EU’s main competitors such as US and China and probably In-
dia seem to have acquired. Compared to these countries the current EU fintech approach is 
more cautious. Whilst China and India currently need fintech more than EU in order to catch 
up with the latter in terms of the provision of basic financial services and financial inclusion, 
this may change in future rounds of competition where the technological capacity and expertise 
they currently build could help them gain competitive advantage. Other developed countries 
such as US,  Japan, Switzerland, North Korea, Australia and Canada could also move faster 
than EU given the latter’s more cautious approach to innovation and heavier reliance on tradi-
tional banking. EU cannot afford to be left behind.  
This article showed that in order to build an effective framework for the regulation of 
fintech, EU regulators may have to step outside of their comfort zone and adopt a bolder ap-
proach than in the past. The Fintech Action Plan and other recent EU initiatives outline some 
steps in this direction, but bolder action will be needed in the future if EU wishes to remain a 




167 supra n. 9. 
168 Ibid. at 7. 
